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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a forensic method for identifying whether an 
image was previously compressed by JPEG. Though some 
methods have already been proposed for this purpose, Stamm and 
Liu’s anti-forensic method disables the detection capabilities of 
these methods. After analyzing the anti-forensics method, we 
propose to use the decimal histogram of the coefficients to 
distinguish the never-compressed images from the previously 
compressed; even the compressed image is anti-forensically 
processed. Experimental results show that this method has a good 
forensic capability. 
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Anti-forensics, JPEG Compression 
1.  Introduction  
With the development of computer technologies, digital 
images can easily be processed by editing software and 
spread via internet. This provides forgers opportunities for 
manipulating original images into fakes [1]. As a result, 
researchers have developed many forensics schemes to 
detect the probable forgeries in digital images. Though 
most forgeries may not be perceived by human vision, 
features extracted from the image can be used to reveal the 
tampering fact [2, 3].  
 
A particular type of forensics is the operation of JPEG 
compression, which is a very popular method for image 
compression. With the method proposed in [4], an image’s 
origin can be identified by analyzing the quantization steps 
of JPEG compression and compare them with a database 
containing kinds of camera models and editing software. If 
the parameters match, decisions of manipulations can be 
made. Some schemes have also been proposed for 
identifying whether an image in uncompressed format was 
previously compressed by JPEG. Fan and Queiroz proposed 
a method able to estimate the quantization steps by 
analyzing the DCT coefficients of the image [5]. Some 
other methods such as [6] and [7] are proposed to detect the 
existence of double JPEG compression.  
 
However, these forensic methods can be defeated by anti-
forensic methods hiding the features of tampering 
operations. In [8] and [9], Stamm and Liu proposed to hide 
the JPEG compression history by adding noise into the 
DCT coefficients. During compression, the Laplacian 
distribution of coefficients’ histograms changes to discrete 
form, which is an obvious evidence of JPEG compression. 
After adding noise into the coefficients, the discrete gaps of 
the histograms are efficiently padded.  
 
Anti-forensics is compressive for assessing the forensics 
methods and is helpful for improving their reliability [10, 
11]. In this paper, we propose a forensics method to combat 
Stamm and Liu’s anti-forensics to images that are 
previously compressed by JPEG. We find the distribution 
for decimal values of the coefficients of a never-
compressed image is different to that of the previously 
compressed image, and also different to that of the anti-
forensically processed image. 
2.  Related Work 
Previously, Stamm and Liu proposed an effective anti-
forensics method of hiding traces of JPEG compression in 
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[8] and [9]. According to [12], coefficients for AC 
components corresponding to the same subband of a never-
compressed image follow Laplacian distribution. Let X be 
the DCT coefficient at the block position (i, j) for a never-
compressed image,  
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where λ is a Laplacian parameter. 
If the image was previously compressed by JPEG, AC 
coefficients of each subband are distributed as discrete 
Laplacian distribution because of the quantization and the 
reverse. For the the coefficients at the (i, j)-th position, if 
we use the quantization step Qi,j , the distribution would be 
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    , N is the total number of coefficients 
at the (i,  j)-th position, N0 represents the number of 
coefficients taking zero values, and N1 the number of 
nonzero coefficients.  
The discreteness of Laplacian distribution causes comblike 
histograms as many gaps appear. To hide the compression 
evidence, Stamm and Liu introduce noises into the AC 
coefficients to approximately restore the histogram of each 
subband, by 
                                 (4) 
Where N is the additive noise. For the coefficient Y of zeros 
value at the (i, j)-th position, the noise distribution is given 
by 
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3.  Countering Anti-Forensics 
The key idea of Stamm and Liu’s method is to pad the gaps 
appear in the histogram of each subband for AC 
components. However, when analyzing the decimal values 
of the DCT coefficients, we find they are not distributed as 
Laplacian distribution in each subband for never-
compressed images. As a result, we propose to use the 
distribution feature of decimal values in the image to verify 
whether the image was compressed or anti-forensically 
processed. 
 
For a test image X, first divide the image into 8×8 blocks, 
and turn each block into a coefficient block by discrete 
cosine transform (DCT). Let the coefficient at (i,  j)-th 
position of the k-th block be   
 , . Generate the histogram of 
coefficients corresponding to the (i, j)-th position of all the 
blocks, 
  ,                
 ,                       (7) 
Where  hist(·) is the histogram function. The artifact of 
comblike histogram should appear if the image was 
previously compressed. However, if the image had been 
processed by Stamm and Liu.’s anti-forensics method, we 
are unable to find this evidence. 
 
An example is shown in Figure 1, in which (a) is a never-
compressed image, and the histogram of coefficients at 
position (1, 2) is shown in (b). If the image is compressed 
with quality factor 80, histogram of coefficients at the 
subband (1, 2) is changed into (c) that a comblike histogram 
with many gaps. After using Stamm and Liu.’s method, the 
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gaps disappear, and again the histogram is approximately 
turned into a Laplacian distributed form, which is shown in 
(d). 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 1 (a) the original never-compressed image, (b) histogram of the 
coefficients at subband (1, 2), (c) histogram of the coefficients 
corresponding to the compressed image, (d) histogram of the coefficients 
after processing the compressed image by Stamm et al’s anti-forensics 
method. 
In order to decide whether the image was processed by anti-
forensics method, we round   
 ,  to the first decimal,  
  
 ,          10 ∙   
 ,  /10               (8) 
and calculate the difference of   
 ,  with its nearest integer. 
  
 ,              
 ,  ∙     
 ,            
 ,       (9) 
Values of   
 ,    range from –0.5 to 0.4. Generate the 
histogram of   
 , , 
  , 
                
 ,                    (10) 
We call this histogram the “decimal histogram”. 
Because the calculation of DCT randomly produces decimal 
numbers, values of   , 
    are uniformly distributed for the 
never-compressed images. If the image was previously 
compressed by JPEG, coefficients were quantized and thus 
decimal values concentrate around zero. Even Stamm and 
Liu.’s anti-forensics method is unable to conceal the 
evidence. Thus, we further define a function for identifying 
whether the image was compressed,  
    ,   m a x      , 
    m i n 	      , 
         (11) 
and compare     ,  with a threshold T. The threshold we 
used here is 0.05, which comes from the training results 
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shown in the following section. Finally, we can make a 
decision that the image was previously compressed if 
    ,     ; otherwise, it is uncompressed. 
4.  Experimental Results 
To verify the proposed method, we choose the commonly 
used UCID database [13]. A group of decimal histograms 
are shown in Figure 2, in which (a) is the original never-
compressed image, (b) the decimal histograms of (a). After 
JPEG encoding and decoding using quality factor 80, the 
decimal histogram corresponding to subband (1, 2) is 
shown in (c). Then we use Stamm and Liu’s anti-forensics 
method to forge an uncompressed image, decimal 
histogram of which is shown in (d). The decimal histogram 
of the never-compressed image is near flat, while the other 
two histograms have clear peaks on zero. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 2 (a) a never-compressed image, (b) decimal histogram of (a) at the 
subband (1, 2), (c) decimal histogram at the subband (1, 2) of the 
compressed image with quality factor 80, (d) decimal histogram 
corresponding to the image processed by anti-forensics 
To determine the threshold, we randomly use 200 images 
from the UCID database and turn them into grey images. 
Each image is compressed by JPEG using quality factor 20, 
50 and 80, respectively. These images are then forged by 
Stamm and Liu’s anti-forensics method. Figure 3 shows the 
values of     ,  for all images, which are used to determine 
the threshold for identifying whether an image was 
compressed or processed by anti-forensics. According to the 
results shown in Figure 3, we choose T=0.05. 
We further use 400 never-compressed images for testing the 
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proposed scheme. Experimental results are shown in Table 
1. With the predefined threshold 0.05, more than 90% of the 
never-compressed images are truly determined, and all the 
previously compressed images that were further processed 
by Stamm and Liu’s method are truly determined. Detection 
results show that the proposed scheme has a good forensic 
capability. 
 
Figure 3 Threshold training using 200 images from UCID 
Table 1 Detection Results 
Decision  Never-
Compressed 
Stamm et al.’s Anti-forensics 
Processed 
QF=80 QF=50 QF=20 
True 91%  100%  100%  100% 
False 9%  0  0  0 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a forensics method for 
identifying whether an image was previously compressed. 
This method is designed to combat Stamm and Liu’s anti-
forensics method. By analyzing the decimal values of the 
DCT coefficients, we have found that the distributions in 
the decimal histogram are different for never-compressed 
images and previously compressed images, even if the 
compressed traces are hidden by the anti-forensics 
processing. Experimental results show that with proper 
threshold high detection rates are achieved. 
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